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W-state is an important resource for many quantum information processing tasks. In this paper, we 
for the first time propose a multi-party measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution 
(MDI-QKD) protocol based on W-state. With linear optics, we design a W-state analyzer in order to 
distinguish the four-qubit W-state. This analyzer constructs the measurement device for four-party 
MDI-QKD. Moreover, we derived a complete security proof of the four-party MDI-QKD, and 
performed a numerical simulation to study its performance. The results show that four-party MDI-
QKD is feasible over 150 km standard telecom fiber with off-the-shelf single photon detectors. This 
work takes an important step towards multi-party quantum communication and a quantum network. 
The quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, which is based on the principles of quantum mechanism, is 
unconditionally secure in theory1,2. For a review, see, e.g. Ref. 3. In practice, however, a QKD system still 
has security loopholes due to the gap between theory and practice. Various attacks have been successfully 
launched through the exploration of these loopholes, e.g. a time-shift attack4, 5, a phase-remapping attack6, a 
blinding attack7, 8, and so forth9-11. To close this gap, the first method is to build precise mathematical models 
for all the devices and refine the security proofs to include these models12. However, this method is 
challenging to implement due to the complexity of QKD components. In addition, a device-independent 
QKD (DI-QKD) was proposed13, 14. In DI-QKD, the legitimate participants during the process of 
communication, namely, Alice and Bob, do not need to obtain precise mathematical models for their devices, 
and all side-channels can be removed from QKD implementations if certain requirements can be satisfied. 
However, the implementation requires a loophole-free Bell test, which is still out the scope of current 
technology. Instead, a new protocol, measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD)15 (for a review, see 
Ref. 16), was proposed. This protocol is fully practicable with current technology. Unlike security patches17, 
18, MDI-QKD can remove all detector side-channel attacks. This kind of attack is arguably the most important 
security loophole in conventional QKD implementations7-11, 19. The measurement setup in MDI-QKD can be 
fully untrusted and even manufactured by Eve. The experimental feasibility of MDI-QKD has been 
demonstrated in both the laboratory and field tests20-23. MDI-QKD has also attracted a lot of scientific 
attention from theoretical side24-31. In addition to the application in QKD, MDI technique can also be used in 
other quantum information processing tasks, such as MDI entanglement-witness32. 
In addition to the two-party QKD protocol, researchers have also proposed various multi-party QKD 
protocols. Generally, there are three types of multi-party QKD schemes. The first one is based on a trusted 
center (TC)33, in which each user shares a secret key with the TC and builds a common session key. The 
second one is an entanglement-based multi-party QKD protocol. Cabello proposed a multi-party QKD 
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protocol that uses Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states34 and that is an extension of a two-party 
entanglement-based QKD protocol2. Chen and Lo proposed a wide class of distillation schemes for multi-
party entanglement, which have been applied to implement conference key agreement35,36. The third one is a 
multi-party QKD protocol without the use of entanglement and TC. Matsumoto proposed a QKD protocol in 
which Alice sends the same qubits sequence to Bob and Charlie respectively, and the qubits with coincident 
bases are used to build a secret key after post-processing37. In the first type of scheme, information may be 
leaked since pre-shared secret bits are used repeatedly. In the second type, a perfect GHZ state should be 
prepared. In the third type, two prepare-and-measure QKD processes are implemented. Nevertheless, up until 
now, a key weakness of all multi-party quantum cryptographic protocols is the assumption that the 
measurement devices are trusted. As aforementioned, the occurrence of many quantum hacking attacks 
indicates that this is a highly unrealistic assumption. 
In order to remove the demanding requirement for trusted measurement devices, we focus our attention 
on multi-party MDI-QKD. Appropriate entanglement states and their analyzers are the premises for the 
design of a multi-party MDI-QKD protocol. An elegant GHZ-type multi-party MDI-QKD protocol has been 
recently proposed in Ref. 38, and this protocol shows that three-party MDI-QKD is highly feasible in practice. 
However, Ref. 38 is primarily limited to three participants, and in a situation with more participants, the 
GHZ-type MDI-QKD is restricted to a very low key rate. Another potential candidate to build multi-party 
MDI-QKD is cluster state, but an efficient cluster-state analyzer based on linear optics remains unknown. 
Therefore, in a large-scale quantum Internet, a better analyzer and a different type of entanglement state are 
essential and required in order to design a multi-party MDI-QKD protocol and to obtain a high key rate. 
W-state is a category of multi-particle entanglement state that can be used in a number of quantum 
information processing protocols39. W-state can be generated by type-II spontaneous parametric down-
conversion (SPDC) and linear optical components40,41. In comparison with GHZ state, an important property 
of W -state is that, if one particle is traced out and projected into a specified state, the remaining particles 
are still entangled. That is, W-state is highly robust. Nonetheless, a W -state analyzer, which would enable 
the state of multiple particles to be projected into a W -state, still has to be constructed properly. 
Here, we, for the first time, propose a multi-party QKD protocol based on W-state. We present the 
application of W -state in multi-party QKD, and construct a new W -state analyzer to distinguish the four-
qubit W -state, based on linear optics only. With this analyzer, a four-party W -state MDI-QKD protocol is 
proposed. In this protocol, the four users, Alice, Bob, Charlie, and David, each send BB84 qubits to the 
central relay, Emma, with a W -state analyzer. The qubits with successful measurement outputs and 
coincident bases are used to build a secret key. The results show that the scheme is highly feasible for 
practically distributing the post-selected-state entanglement and for generating secure keys over a distance 
of more than 150 km standard telecom fiber for experimentally accessible parameter regimes. With state-of-
the-art high-efficiency detectors, four-party MDI-QKD is feasible over 250 km fiber. We remark that, our 
protocol can be extended to the case with more participants and still remain a high key rate. All these features 
move an important step towards practical multi-party quantum communication. 
Results 
W -state and its analyzer. In this section, a group of four-particle entanglement W  states is introduced, 
and a four-particle W-state analyzer based on linear optics is proposed.  
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4W  state. The standard n-qubit W -state is defined by ( 3n ≥ )42 
( )1 10 0 01 0 00 1nW n= + + +                                        (1) 
If 4n = , the four-qubit W -state is given by 
( )4 1 2 1000 0100 0010 + 0001W = + +                                        (2) 
There are nine families of states that correspond to nine different ways of entangling four qubits43. For 
W -state, the widely used state is the standard one, given by equation (2). Here, based on the 4W  state, 16 
four-qubit W states can be constructed, and these states appear in Supplementary I. All these 4W  states form 
a group of orthogonal bases in a 16-dimensional Hilbert space. Any four-qubit state can be expressed as a 
linear combination of these 16 4W  states. The protocol proposed in this paper is based on these states. 
A four-photon 4W  state analyzer. The tomography of W -states has been a hot topic in recent years44-46.  
However, the method for designing an analyzer to verify a W -state is still an open question. 
In fact, a four-qubit 4W  state can be expressed by Bell states, which is presented as below. 
( ) ( )4, 0 12 12 34 12 34 341 2W φ φ ψ ψ φ φ+ − + + + − = + + +  ,                          (3) 
where φ+ , φ− , and ψ +  are three Bell states. From equation (3), we find that it is possible to design a 
4W  state analyzer based on a Bell-state analyzer. Indeed, this is our method to construct the 4W  state 
analyzer. 
   Generally, with an optimal linear optics-based scheme and without the use of auxiliary photons, only two 
out of four Bell states can be distinguished47. However, an important time-bin-based Bell-state analyzer can 
distinguish three out of four Bell states48. Its schematic representation is shown in Fig.1. In this scheme, the 
qubit is encoded with time bins49. The qubit 0  ( 1 ) corresponds to a photon in state 
0
†ˆ 0ta  ( 1
†ˆ 0ta ) 
under Z-basis, or in state ( )0 1† †ˆ ˆ1 2 0t ta a+  ( ( )0 1† †ˆ ˆ1 2 0t ta a− ) under X-basis, where 1 0t t τ= +  and τ  is a 
constant time. The device consists of two beam splitters,  1BS  and 2BS , two fibers with time delay τ , 
and two single photon detectors, 1D  and 2D , all of which build a time-bin interferometer. 
In Fig.1, let † ,ˆ p ta  denote the creation operators in spatial mode p ( , , , , ,p a b c d e f= ) and temporal 
mode t  ( 0 1t t or t=  for modes , , ,a b c d ; 0 1 2,t t t or t=  for modes e  and f ). After passing through 1BS , 
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let the relative phase between the transmitted light field and the reflected light field be π ., then the operators 
evolve as follows50 
( )† † †, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ1 2a t c t d ta ia a→ − +  ,                                                   (4) 
( )† † †, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ1 2b t c t d ta a ia→ −  .                                                    (5) 
 
Figure 1. A schematic diagram of Bell-state measurement48. 1BS  and 2BS  are ideal 50/50 optical beam splitters that 
have equal reflection and transmission coefficients and no absorption loss. The delay t∆  derived from the path length 
difference of the interferometer equals τ . When two qubits enter the interferometer, the output state is a mixture of photons 
in two spatial modes ( e  and f ) and three temporal modes ( 0 1,t t  and 2t ). Three Bell states can be distinguished through 
an analysis of different combinations of these modes of four photons.  
 
Next, after the time-bin interferometer, the creation operators evolve into  
( )† † † † †, , , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 2 +ei ia t e t e t f t f ta a a ia ie aδ δτ τ+ +→ − + +  ,                                     (6) 
( )† † † † †, , , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 2 -ei ib t f t f t e t e ta a a ia ie aδ δτ τ+ +→ + +   ,                                      (7) 
where δ  is the phase derived from the path length difference in the interferometer48.  Equations (6) and 
(7) indicate that the photons may arrive at 1D  or 2D  at different time instants, 0t , 1t , or 2t , according to 
input states, as shown in Fig.1. From the output coincidence, in principle, Bell-states  
ab
ψ +  can be 
detected with 100% probability, and 
ab
ψ −  and 
ab
φ+  can be detected with 50% probability, 
respectively48. 
The W-state analyzer shown in Fig. 2 is proposed. The qubits 0  and 1  are also encoded with the 
time-bin. At the first stage, the states of the photons in spatial modes a  and b  evolve into the states at 
modes e  and f , according to equations (6) and (7). In ways that are also similar to equations (6) and (7), 
the states of the photons in spatial modes c  and d  evolve into the ones in modes g  and h ; the ones in 
modes f  and g evolve into the ones in modes j  and k ; the ones in modes e  and h  evolve into the 
ones in modes l  and m .  
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Figure 2. A schematic diagram of a W -state analyzer. The analyzer consists of four time-bin interferometers. Each 
interferometer is the same as the one shown in Fig.1. Two photons from port A and B enter into the interferometer I. The photon 
in spatial mode e  enters into interferometer IV, and the photon in spatial mode f  enters into interferometer III. Another 
two photons from port C and D enter into interferometer II. The photon in spatial mode g  enters into interferometer III, and 
the photon in spatial mode h  enters into interferometer IV. The state of photons at the output is in a superposition state of 
four spatial modes ( , , ,s u v w ) and four temporal modes ( 0 1 2, ,t t t and 3t ). By analysis of different combinations of these modes, 
four out of sixteen W -states can be distinguished.  
After 9BS  and 10BS , the states of photons evolve into 
( )† † †, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ1 2j t s t u ta ia a→ − +                                                     (8) 
( )† † †, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ1 2k t s t u ta a ia→ −                                                      (9) 
( )† † †, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ1 2l t v t w ta ia a→ − +                                                    (10) 
( )† † †, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ1 2m t v t w ta a ia→ −                                                     (11) 
Based on equations (6) - (11), the output detection modes of each of 16 4W  states can be obtained. As 
an example, the state 4, 0W  is discussed.  Its operator form is 
( )4, 0 1 2 0001 0010 0100 1000W = + + +  
  
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
† † † † † † † † † † † † † † † †
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 2 0a t b t c t d t a t b t c t d t a t b t c t d t a t b t c t d ta a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a = + + +            (12) 
Then, by using equations (6) - (11), 4, 0W  evolves into 
( ) ( ) ( ){ † † † † † † † †4, 0 , , , , , , , ,
† † † † † † † † † † † †
, , , , , , , , , , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ128 8
i i i
s t s t s t s t w t s t u t w t
i i i
s t u t v t w t s t u t v t w t s t u t v t w t
W e a a e a a a e a a a
e a a a a e a a a a e a a a a
δ δ δ
δ δ δ
0 1 1 2 2 1 1 1
0 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 2 0 1
3 2 22 6 3
2 2 2
→1 2048 64 −192 − 64 + +
+128 +12 + +


}† † † † † † † †, , , , , , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ128 i iv t v t w t w t v t v t w t w te a a a a e a a a aδ δ0 1 1 3 0 2 1 24 4+128 0
     (13) 
There are 200 terms in equation (13). That means that the output state is a superposition of 200 states. 
Each of the states is called a detection mode. Here, detection mode means SPD clicks at some spatial modes 
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and time-bins;  e.g., † † † †, , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆi j k ls t u t v t w ta a a a  means that photons clicks occur in spatial modes s , u , v , and w  
at the time instant it , jt , kt , and lt ( , , , 0,1, 2,3)i j k l = , respectively. ( )
2† † †
, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆi j ks t u t v ta a a  means that two 
photons arrive in s  mode at it . One photon occurs in u  mode at jt , and one photon occurs in v  mode 
at time kt , respectively. The spatial and temporal modes are shown in Fig. 3.  
 
Figure 3. The spatial and temporal modes at the output of the W -state analyzer. There are four spatial modes (i.e., , ,s u v , 
and w ) and four temporal modes (i.e., 0 1 2, ,t t t , and 3t ). The time separation between time-bins is τ . The output state is a 
superposition of spatial modes and temporal modes. 
All detection modes of 16 4W  states have been obtained. By comparing the detection modes among 
different states, the unique modes belonging to one specific state are obtained. These modes make one state 
distinguishable from the others. Here, only the modes in which the SPD click derives from one photon are 
taken into account; i.e., all four SPDs in each mode have a click. There are four 4W  states, i.e., 4, 0W , 
4, 1W , 4, cW , and 4, dW , that can be identified with the proposed analyzer. Their detection modes are 
shown in Table 1. The success rate is determined by the corresponding coefficients of output states. For states 
4, 0W  and 4, cW , the probability of successful detection is [ ]20 128 2048 12 0.0469pD = × = . For states 4, 1W  
and 4, dW , the probability of successful detection is [ ]21 128 2048 4 0.0156pD = × = . Therefor the total success 
probability is ( )0 11 16 2 2 0.78%p p pD D D= × + = . These four states can be applied to build keys among four users, 
a process that will be discussed in section III. 
It is worth mentioning that four other states, i.e., 4, 2W , 4, 3W , 4, eW  and 4, fW , can also be 
distinguished if photon-number-resolving detectors can be used. In addition, the detection probabilities of 
states 4, 0W , 4, 1W , 4, cW , and 4, dW  can also be increased with this type of detector. 
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TABLE 1. Distinguishable 4W  states and their detection modes. Four 4W  states, i.e., 4, 0W , 4, 1W , 4, cW , and 
4, dW , can be identified by the proposed analyzer. Detection modes i j k ls u v w  mean that photons clicks occur in the spatial 
modes s , u , v ,  and w , and at the temporal modes it , jt , kt , and lt ( , , , 0,1, 2,3)i j k l = , respectively.  
 
No. 
Distinguished 
states 
Detection modes Success 
probability 
I 4, 0W  0 1 0 2s u v w , 0 1 1 1s u v w , 0 1 1 3s u v w , 0 1 2 2s u v w , 
0 2 0 1s u v w , 0 2 0 3s u v w , 0 3 0 2s u v w , 1 1 0 1s u v w , 
1 1 2 1s u v w , 1 3 0 1s u v w , 2 1 1 1s u v w , 2 2 0 1s u v w  
0.0469  
II 4, 1W  0 1 0 3s u v w , 0 1 2 1s u v w , 0 3 0 1s u v w , 2 1 0 1s u v w  0.0156  
III 4, cW  0 2 2 3s u v w , 0 3 1 3s u v w , 1 1 2 3s u v w , 1 3 0 3s u v w  
1 3 2 3s u v w , 2 1 2 2s u v w , 2 2 2 1s u v w , 2 2 2 3s u v w , 
2 3 0 2s u v w , 2 3 1 1s u v w , , 2 3 1 3s u v w , 2 3 2 2s u v w  
0.0469  
IV 4, dW  0 3 2 3s u v w , 2 1 2 3s u v w , 2 3 0 3s u v w , 2 3 2 1s u v w  0.0156  
 
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution based on W-state. In this section, we 
propose a four-party MDI-QKD protocol based on 4W  state and the analyzer presented in the previous 
section. The security of the protocol is also proved. 
The protocol. Conceptually, the four-party MDI-QKD can be implemented based on a time-reversal 4W  
state protocol. In this protocol, each of the four users can prepare an entangled EPR photon pairs, keep one 
photon from each pair, and send the other photon to the central relay. Then projective measurement on the 
state of the photons can be performed by the relay. If the state is projected into a 4W  state by the relay, the 
state of the remaining four photons in the users is projected to the same 4W  state. Through the use of the 
idea of a virtual qubit16, a four-party MDI-QKD scheme can be constructed. 
The proposed setup of four-party MDI-QKD protocol is shown in Fig. 4. There are four participants, 
i.e., Alice, Bob, Charlie, and David. Photons from single photon sources (SPS) are encoded with time-bin. 
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Generally, weak coherent pulse (WCP) sources combined with decoy state technology51-53 can also be used 
to replace the SPS. Here, SPS is used to simplify the discussion.  
 
Figure 4. Basic setup of a 4W -based four-party MDI-QKD protocol. Alice, Bob, Charlie, and David prepare single photon 
pulses in a different BB84 time-bin coded state, which is selected independently and at random for each signal. The time-bin 
encoder can follow the design proposed in Ref. 20. Inside the measurement setup, signals from Alice, Bob, Charlie, and David 
are sent into a W-state analyzer (see Fig. 2). Successful output corresponds to the observation of one of four 4W  states shown 
in Table 1. The four participants’ laboratories are well shielded from the eavesdropper, and the measurement setup can be 
untrusted. 
The procedures of the protocol are as follows: 
(1) Preparing: Each one of the participants, i.e., Alice, Bob, Charlie, and David, prepares single photons, 
which are in the four possible BB84 time-bin states (i.e., 0 , 1 , + , and − )  and sends them to an 
untrusted relay, Emma, with an analyzer in the middle. The preparation processes are implemented by single 
photon sources and a time-bin encoder. 
(2) Measuring: Emma performs 4W  state measurement by using the analyzer in Fig. 2. Then the 
incoming signals are projected into a 4W  state. 
(3) Sifting: Emma uses public channels to announce the events in which she obtained successful outputs; 
i.e., some of the states in Table 1 are identified. When all participants use the rectilinear (Z) basis, two of 
them announce their bits, and the other two perform operations according to the scenarios shown in Table 2. 
In addition to the case that all participants encode their qubits in Z basis, another case is that they encode 
their qubits in X basis. For the latter, the W-states can be described as states +  and − , e.g.,  
( ) ( )( )
( )
4, 0 1 4 2
2
W = + + + + + + − + − + + + − + − + + + − − − −
− − + − + − + + − − 
                 (14) 
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TABLE 2. Four participants’ post-selection after Emma announces a successful output of states 4, 0W  or 4, 1W  ( 4, cW  
or 4, dW ). Any two participants announce their classic bits. If the bits are “00” (“11”), the other two participants can obtain 
the raw key bits; i.e., one of them flips his or her bits. For example, when Alice and Bob announce classic bits “00” (“11”), one 
of the pair Charlie and David flips his bits. This way, any two participants can perform QKD. The optical quantum channel 
need not be changed. 
 
Announced bits Participants who obtain the key bits and 
their operation Alice Bob Charlie David 
0 (1) 0 (1) - - Charlie & David, one of their bits flips. 
0 (1) - 0 (1) - Bob & David, one of their bits flips. 
0 (1) - - 0 (1) Bob & Charlie, one of their bits flips. 
- 0 (1) 0 (1) - Alice & David, one of their bits flips 
- 0 (1) - 0 (1) Alice & Charlie, one of their bits flips. 
- - 0 (1) 0 (1) Alice & Bob, one of their bits flips. 
 
and 
( ) ( )( )
( )
4, 1 4 2
2
cW = + + + + − + − − − + − + − + − + + + − − − +
− − + − + − + − − − 
                  (15) 
In this case, the first two announce the values of the qubits ( + −  or − + ), and the other two perform 
phase error rate estimation. 
(4) Post-processing: After obtaining the sifted key, the two participants perform information 
reconciliation and privacy amplification. The suggestion is that an error correction code-based reconciliation 
protocol be used, since the interactive protocol, e.g., Cascade54, requires many communications. A low-
density parity-check (LDPC) code-based reconciliation scheme55 can be used. 
Security analysis. The security of the four-party W -state-based MDI-QKD protocol is inspired by the 
security of a time reversed W-state-based QKD protocol. 
First, we briefly introduce the W -state-based QKD protocol. In a three-party W-state-based QKD 
protocol, three particles in 3W  state are distributed to three participants respectively. The announcement of  
the measurement bases and the measurement results of one participant enables the other two to perform key 
distribution or security verification. The protocol can be extended to the one with four participants. Compared 
with a three-party QKD protocol, in the one with four participants, two participants announce their 
measurement bases and results, and the other two are in a maximally entangled Bell state and can obtain a 
secret key. 
Secondly, it can be demonstrated that a time reversed W -state-based QKD protocol exists as the same 
as the time reversed EPR protocol56. With reference to the two-party MDI-QKD protocol15, the idea of a 
virtual qubit is also used. One can imagine that each of four participants prepares an EPR entanglement state, 
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sends one qubit to Emma, and retains the other qubit as a virtual qubit. The virtual qubit is subsequently 
measured, and a BB84 state is thus prepared. In principle, each one could keep his or her virtual qubit in his 
or her memory and delay his or her measurement of it. Only after Emma has announced that she has obtained 
a successful outcome will each perform a measurement on his or her virtual qubit in order to decide which 
state he or she is sending to Emma. Furthermore, it is shown that W-state can be prepared among four 
participants by entanglement swapping, while each participant prepares an EPR pair initially. So, in such a 
virtual qubit setting, the protocol is equivalent to an entanglement-based protocol. Alice, Bob, Charlie, and 
David share quadruple qubits in their quantum memories, and they can compute the quantum bit error rate 
(QBER) on their virtual qubits on a special basis. 
Key rate of the four-party MDI-QKD protocol. The key rate of the W-state-based MDI-QKD protocol is 
evaluated with SPS. According to the procedures described in section III.A, any two participants can build a 
secret key after Emma announces successful outputs, and the other two participants’ classic bits are 00 or 11. 
So the key rate can be obtained by referring to the case of two-party MDI-QKD15 and to the basic work of 
Shor and Preskill57. The difference between the four-party and the two-party MDI-QKD is that the gain in 
the four-party one refers to the joint probability that Emma announces successful output and two of 
participants’ classic bits are 00 (or 11), according to Table 2. Since any two participants can build a secret 
key, the maximum information loss value in data reconciliation and the privacy amplification processes of 
each pair are considered. So the key rate can be given as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) }
0 1 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
1 , , , , ,
, , , ,
,
X X X X X
cd bd bc ad ac
X Z Z Z Z
ab cd bd bc ad
Z Z
ac ab
R qQ Max H e H e H e H e H e
H e Max H e H e H e H e
H e H e
= − 
 − 

                   (16) 
where Xjke  (
Z
jke ) denotes the QBER between participants j  and k  under X (Z) basis, given that 
each of Alice ( a ), Bob ( b ), Charlie ( c ), and David ( d ) sends single photon states, , , , ,j k a b c d= ; 1Q  
denotes the gain (the joint probability of Emma’s announcement of  a successful detection in the Z basis, 
and also of the announced classic bits being 00 or 11, according to Table 2).  q  means the basis 
reconciliation factor; ( )2H x  is the binary entropy function with parameter x  given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2log 1 log 1H x x x x x= − − − − . 
In this protocol, the QBER in Z basis equals the one in X-basis under SPS, i.e. X Zjk jke e= . The assumption 
is that there is no misalignment error, that the data size is infinite, and that the ideal reconciliation algorithm 
is applied. There is also an assumption that the quantum channels between the participants and Emma are 
identical. For the sake of simplicity, if we assume 1e  to be 
Z
jke , then equation (16 ) can be reduced to 
( ){ }0 1 2 11 2R qQ H e= −                                                       (17) 
Let the probability of Z basis be nearly one, i.e., 1q ≈ . 1Q  can be estimated as (the detailed for 
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obtaining 1Q  and 1e  are shown in Methods and Supplementary III) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
12 4 3 24 3 2 2
1 0 0 0 0
3 4
0 0 1
1 1024 1 1440 1 496 1
49 1 8 128p p
Q Y Y Y Y
Y D D
η η η η η
η η η
= − − + − + − +
− + + 
                  (18) 
and the QBER 1e as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
12 4 3 24 3 2 2
1 0 0 0 0
1
3
0
1 1 64 1 90 1 31 1
16
3 1
e Y Y Y Y
Q
Y
η η η η η
η η
= − − + − + − +
− 
                  (19) 
where η  is the channel transmittance between the participant and the analyzer, 1010 l d
αη η− ⋅= ⋅ ;   α  and 
l  are the attenuation coefficient and fiber length between the participant and analyzer, and dη  is the 
detection efficiency of a single photon detector. Here, it is assumed that each SPD at each time instant has 
the same detection efficiency. 
In numerical simulation, the parameters include the detection efficiency dη , the background count 
rate 0Y  and the attenuation coefficient α . Let dη  be 14.5%  and 0Y  be 66.02 10−× . These values are 
chosen from the 144-Km QKD experiment reported in Ref. 58. A superconducting nanowire single-photon 
detector (SNSPD) with a detection efficiency of 93%, as reported by Marsili et.al.59, is also used. Parameter 
α  is set by a typical value, 0.2 .The simulation results of the asymptotic key rate are shown in Fig. 5. The 
secure transmission distance between two participants is about 180 km for a detection efficiency of 14.5%, 
and is about 260 km for a detection efficiency of 93%. The distance is 100 km and 180 km for two detectors 
when the key rate is about 1010− .  
 
Figure 5 Key rates with different detection efficiencies. Both curves are key rates with single photon sources (SPSs). The 
solid curve is the one with a detection efficiency of 14.5%. The dash-and-dot is the one with the higher detection efficiency of 
93%. 
 
Discussion 
In practice, the SPS may still be challenging with current technology. However, based on the so-called 
11 
 
decoy state method51-53, one can simply replace the SPS with weak coherent pulses (WCP) or parametric 
down- conversion (PDC) sources. As noted already in Ref. 38 regarding the three-party MDI-QKD, the decoy 
state analysis and the finite-key analysis are similar to the initial two-party MDI-QKD protocol24-28. Therefore, 
the expectation is that, with decoy states, the results here can be easily extended to the cases with WCP and 
PDC sources. 
In our proposal, any two of four parties can share a secure key bit. This is compatible to the usual 
network scenario, in which any two parties in the network can perform secure communications. There are 
several advantages as compared to the initial two-party MDI-QKD protocol. First, our proposal is faster in 
sharing key bits when the parties are reassigned. This is because the quantum channel is not required to be 
initialized. Second, the group key can also be built if one party serves as a controller. Finally, the initial MDI-
QKD requires a clever design of fast and low-loss optical switches for a network setting, which might be 
challenging in a large-scale network. In contrast, our scheme does not have such requirement. 
In the conclusion, we proposed a four-party W-state-based MDI-QKD protocol, in which any two of 
four participants can build secret keys, when the W-state analyzer announces a successful output, and the 
other two participants’ classic bits sent are 00 (the distinguished states are 4, 0W or 4, 1W ) or 11 (the 
distinguished states are 4, cW  or 4, dW ). Since the time-bin coded MDI-QKD protocol was verified to be 
feasible20, 22, 29, and several schemes of SPS (e.g. quantum dot SPS60 ) have been presented, the proposed W-
state analyzer can be implemented with current technology. The work presented here puts forward an 
important avenue for practical multi-party quantum communication. 
Methods 
W-state preparation based on entanglement swapping. A process of entanglement swapping for 
generating 4W -state is shown in Fig.6. 
 
Figure 6. A schematic diagram of entanglement swapping for generating 4W  state. Each of Alice, Bob, Charlie and 
David prepares an EPR pair and sends half of them to Emma with a 4W  State analyzer.  
In Fig.6, all the photon pairs A  and A′ , B  and B′ , C  and C′ , D  and D′  are in Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) entangled states. When the state of 4 photons, , ,A B C′ ′ ′  and D′ , are projected into to any 
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4W  state, the state of remaining four photons , , ,A B C  and D , is projected into the corresponding 4W  
sate. The detailed processes are shown in Supplementary II. 
Estimation of 1Q  and 1e . We assume that there is no misalignment error (i.e. all mismatches in quantum 
channels are perfectly compensated), the four optical channels are identical, and ideal single photon sources 
are used. Therefore, the qubit error derives from dark counts of SPDs. As mentioned in Results, we only take 
into account the case in which SPD count in each spatial-temporal mode derives from no more than one 
photon.  
For Emma, a successful output can be obtained from five cases: (1) all four counts of SPDs derive from 
background noise (dark counts); (2) one count derives from photon detection and the other three counts derive 
from background noise; (3) two counts derive from photon detections and the other two counts derive from 
background noise; (4) three counts derive from photon detections and the other one derives from background 
noise; (5) all four counts derive from photons. We assume that Alice (a) and Bob (b) announce their classical 
bits, while, Charlie (c) and David (d) try to generate secret key bits. In cases (2) - (5) we compute the output 
states of photons successfully passing through the analyzer and their probabilities. Then, we obtain the gain 
at each case according to the modes in Table 1. The details for obtaining 1Q  and 1e are shown in 
Supplementary III. 
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I. 16 4W  states 
The 16 4W  states are given as follows: 
( )4, 0 1 2 0001 0010 0100 1000W = + + +                                            (S1) 
( )4, 1 1 2 0001 0010 0100 1000W = − − +                                            (S2) 
( )4, 2 1 2 0001 0010 0100 1000W = − + −                                            (S3) 
( )4, 3 1 2 0001 0010 0100 1000W = + − −                                            (S4) 
( )4, 4 1 2 0000 1100 1010 1001W = + + +                                            (S5) 
( )4, 5 1 2 0000 1100 1010 1001W = − − +                                            (S6) 
( )4, 6 1 2 0000 1100 1010 1001W = − + −                                            (S7) 
( )4, 7 1 2 0000 1100 1010 1001W = + − −                                            (S8) 
( )4, 8 1 2 0011 0101 0110 1111W = + + +                                            (S9) 
( )4, 9 1 2 0011 0101 0110 1111W = − − +                                            (S10) 
( )4, a 1 2 0011 0101 0110 1111W = − + −                                            (S11) 
( )4, b 1 2 0011 0101 0110 1111W = + − −                                            (S12) 
( )4, c 1 2 0111 1011 1101 1110W = + + +                                            (S13) 
( )4, d 1 2 0111 1011 1101 1110W = − − +                                            (S14) 
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( )4, e 1 2 0111 1011 1101 1110W = − + −                                            (S15) 
( )4, f 1 2 0111 1011 1101 1110W = + − −                                            (S16) 
The state 4, 0W  given by equation (S1) is a standard 4W  state and belongs to one family states 
defined in Ref. 1.  The states 4, 1W , 4, 2W  and 4, 3W  can be constructed by performing unitary 
operations IZZI , ZIZI  and ZZII  on state 4, 0W , respectively, where I  is the unit operator and Z  is 
the Pauli Z  operator. The states 4, cW , 4, dW , 4, eW and 4, fW  can be constructed by performing 
XXXX  operations on the states 4, 0W , 4, 1W , 4, 2W  and 4, 3W , respectively, where X  is the Pauli 
X  operator. The state 4, 4W  can be obtained by performing unitary operation U 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
U =
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
on 4, 0W . The states 4, 5W , 4, 6W and 4, 7W  can be obtained by performing ZIIZ , ZIZI  and ZZII  
operations on state 4, 4W , respectively. The state 4, 8W  can be obtained by performing XXXX  operation 
on state 4, 4W . The state 4, 9W  can be obtained by performing IIZZ operation on state 4, 8W . The states 
4, aW  and 4, bW  can be obtained by performing XXXX− on states 4, 6W  and 4, 5W , respectively. All 
these 4W  states form a group of orthogonal bases in the 16-dimensional Hilbert space. Any 4-qubit state 
can be expressed as a linear combination of these 16 4W  states. 
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II. Details of W-state preparation based on entanglement swapping 
Let the 4 Bell states prepared by Alice, Bob, Charlie and David are ( )1 2 00 11AA AAAAφ
+
′ ′′
= + , 
BB
φ+
′
= ( )1 2 00 11BB BB′ ′+ , ( )1 2 00 11CC CCCCφ
+
′ ′′
= +  and ( )1 2 00 11DD DDDDφ
+
′ ′′
= + , 
respectively. The state of the system is 
( )( )( )( )
{
1 4 00 11 00 11 00 11 00 11
1 4 0000 0000 0001 0001 0010 0010
0011 0011 0100 0100 0101 0101
0110 0110
S AA AA BB BB CC CC DD DD
ABCD A B C D ABCD A B C D ABCD A B C D
ABCD A B C D ABCD A B C D ABCD A B C D
ABCD A B C D
ψ
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′
′ ′ ′ ′
= + + + +
= + + +
+ + + +
+
}
0111 0111 1000 1000
1001 1001 1010 1010 1011 1011
1100 1100 1101 1101 1110 1110
1111 1111
ABCD A B C D ABCD A B C D
ABCD A B C D ABCD A B C D ABCD A B C D
ABCD A B C D ABCD A B C D ABCD A B C D
ABCD A B C D
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′
′ ′ ′ ′
+ + +
+ + + +
+ + + +
+
    (S17) 
The 16 basis states can be represented by 16 4W  states as follows 
( )4,0 4,1 4,2 4,30001 1 2A B C D A B C DW W W W′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= + + +                                      (S18) 
( )4,0 4,1 4,2 4,30010 1 2A B C D A B C DW W W W′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − − +                                      (S19) 
( )4,0 4,1 4,2 4,30100 1 2A B C D A B C DW W W W′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − + −                                      (S20) 
( )4,0 4,1 4,2 4,31000 1 2A B C D A B C DW W W W′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= + − −                                      (S21) 
( )4,4 4,5 4,6 4,70000 1 2A B C D A B C DW W W W′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= + + +                                     (S22) 
( )4,4 4,5 4,6 4,71100 1 2A B C D A B C DW W W W′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − − +                                     (S23) 
( )4,4 4,5 4,6 4,71010 1 2A B C D A B C DW W W W′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − + −                                     (S24) 
( )4,4 4,5 4,6 4,71001 1 2A B C D A B C DW W W W′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= + − −                                     (S25) 
( )4,8 4,9 4, 4,0011 1 2 a bA B C D A B C DW W W W′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= + + +                                     (S26) 
( )4,8 4,9 4, 4,0101 1 2 a bA B C D A B C DW W W W′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − − +                                     (S27) 
( )4,8 4,9 4, 4,0110 1 2 a bA B C D A B C DW W W W′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − + −                                     (S28) 
( )4,8 4,9 4, 4,1111 1 2 a bA B C D A B C DW W W W′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= + − −                                     (S29) 
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( )4, 4, 4, 4,0111 1 2 c d e fA B C D A B C DW W W W′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= + + +                                     (S30) 
( )4, 4, 4, 4,1011 1 2 c d e fA B C D A B C DW W W W′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − − +                                     (S31) 
( )4, 4, 4, 4,1101 1 2 c d e fA B C D A B C DW W W W′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − + −                                     (S32) 
( )4, 4, 4, 4,1110 1 2 c d e fA B C D A B C DW W W W′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= + − −                                    (S33) 
Then,  
{ 4,0 4,0 4,1 4,1 4,2 4,2
4,3 4,3 4,4 4,4 4,5 4,5
4,6 4,6 4,7 4,7 4,8 4,8
4,9
1 4S ABCD A B C D ABCD A B C D ABCD A B C D
ABCD A B C D ABCD A B C D ABCD A B C D
ABCD A B C D ABCD A B C D ABCD A B C D
AB
W W W W W W
W W W W W W
W W W W W W
W
ψ
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′
= + + +
+ + +
+ + +
}
4,9 4, 4, 4, 4,
4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4,
4, 4,
a a b bCD A B C D ABCD A B C D ABCD A B C D
c c d d e eABCD A B C D ABCD A B C D ABCD A B C D
f fABCD A B C D
W W W W W
W W W W W W
W W
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′
′ ′ ′ ′
+ + +
+ + +
              (S34) 
Therefore, from equation (S34) we obtain that when the state of particles , ,A B C′ ′ ′  and D′  are 
projected into one of the 4W  states, the state of particles , ,A B C  and D  will be in the corresponding 4W  
state. 
III. Details of estimation of 1Q  and 1e  
We compute the gains at different cases, respectively. 
(1) Case 1: outputs deriving from four background counts 
In this case, there is no successful photon transmission (with probability ( )( )( )( )1 1 1 1a b c dη η η η− − − − , 
where iη is the transmittance of participant i , , , ,i a b c d= ). Emma will give an output when there exist 
dark counts in four specific modes according to Table 1 (with probability 40Y ) and there are no dark counts 
in other 12 modes (with probability ( )1201 Y−  ) . There are 12 (4) detection modes for states 4,0W  and 
4,cW  ( 4,1W  and 4,dW ). Based on the post-selection scheme shown in Table 2, input states
0000,0001,0010  and 0011 (corresponding to the states 4,0W  and 4,1W ), 1100,1101,1110  and 1111  
(corresponding to 4,cW  and 4,dW ) can be used to generate key.  Each input state ( 0000,0001,...,1110  or 
1111) is prepared with equal probability, i.e. each one with probability 1 16 . So the gain at this case is 
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( )( )( )( ) ( ) ( ){
( )( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) }
( )( )( )( ) ( )
12 124 4
0 0 0 0
12 124 4
0 0 0 0
124
0 0
1 16 4 1 1 1 1 12 1 +4 1 +
4 1 1 1 1 12 1 +4 1
8 1 1 1 1 1
a b c d
a b c d
a b c d
Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y
Y Y
η η η η
η η η η
η η η η
 − − − − − − 
 − − − − − − 
= − − − − −
                        (S35) 
While, qubit error will occur when input states are 0000,0011,1100  and 1111  with probability 
( )( )( )( ) ( )1240 04 1 1 1 1 1a b c d Y Yη η η η− − − − − .                                           (S36) 
(2) Case 2: outputs deriving from one photon count and three background counts 
In this case, one count derives from a successful photon transmission and the other three counts derive 
from background. For an input photon, it can arrive at the SPD in different spatial and temporal modes, e.g. 
the state 
0
†
, 0a ta  of Alice’s photon can be mapped into the state 
( )(
)
† † † † † †
, , , , , ,
† † †
, , ,
i i i
a t s t s t u t u t v t
i i i
v t w t w t
a a e a ie a ie a ia
ie a e a e a
δ δ δ
δ δ δ
0 0 1 1 2 0
1 1 2
2
2
0 →1 4 2 −2 − 2 + 2 + 2 − 2
+2 − 2 + 2 0
,                         (S37) 
and the state 
1
†
, 0a ta  of Alice’s photon can be mapped into the state 
( )(
)
† † † † † †
, , , , , ,
† † †
, , ,
i i i
a t s t s t u t u t v t
i i i
v t w t w t
a a e a ie a ie a ia
ie a e a e a
δ δ δ
δ δ δ
1 1 2 2 3 1
2 2 3
2
2
0 →1 4 2 −2 − 2 + 2 + 2 − 2
+2 − 2 + 2 0
 .                        (S38) 
When Alice’s photon, e.g. in state 
0
†
, 0a ta , is detected and the input state is 0000 , the output 
probability of Emma’s device according to Table 1 is  
( )( )( )( )
( )
( )( )( ) ( )
2 2 2 2 2
122 2 2 2 3
0 0
123
0 0
1 1 1 1 4 2 2 10 2 3 2 10 2 3
2 10 2 3 2 10 2 3 1
208 32 1 1 1 1
a b c d
a b c d
Y Y
Y Y
η η η η
η η η η
− − − × + × + × + × +
× + × + × + × −
= − − − −
                      (S39) 
In equation (S39), 10 denotes the number of operators 
0 1 0 1
† † † †
, , , ,, ,s t u t v t w ta a a a in the detection modes of the 
W states 4,0W  and 4,1W ; 3 denotes the number of operators 1 2 1 2
† † † †
, , , ,, , ,s t u t v t w ta a a a  in the detection modes of 
the W states 4,0W  and 4,1W . Similarly, we can obtain the output probability of other participants’ photons’ 
counts under different inputs state. So, the gain in this case is 
( )( )( ) ( )( )( ){
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) } ( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )( ){
( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) } ( )
123
0 0
123
0 0
1 16 8 208 32 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 208 32 4 96 32 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 16 52 1 1 1 1 1 1
38 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
a b c d b a c d
c a b d d a b c
a b c d b a c d
c a b d d a b c
Y Y
Y Y
η η η η η η η η
η η η η η η η η
η η η η η η η η
η η η η η η η η
× − − − + − − − +  
× + × − − − + − − − −  
= − − − + − − − +  
− − − + − − − −  
   (S40) 
In this case the error will occur with probability 
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( )( )( ) ( )( )( ){
( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) } ( )1230 0
1 16 26 1 1 1 1 1 1
19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
a b c d b a c d
c a b d d a b c Y Y
η η η η η η η η
η η η η η η η η
− − − + − − − +  
− − − + − − − −  
                   (S41) 
(3) Case 3: outputs deriving from two photon counts and two background counts 
In this case, two counts derive from successful photon transmission and two counts derive from 
background. Any state of two input photons can evolve into a state superposed by different spatial and time 
modes, e.g. state 
0 0
† †
, , 0a t b ta a  of Alice’s and Bob’s photons evolves into the state 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
† † † † † †
, , , , , ,
† † † † † † † † †
, , , , , , , , ,
† † †
, , , ,
i i i
a t b t u t u t w t w t
i i i i i
s t u t s t w t u t v t v t w t s t
i i i
s t v t u t u
a a i e a e a a i e a
e a a i e a a i e a a e a a i e a
e a a i e a e a
δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ
0 0 2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1
1 1 1
2 22 2 4 4 4
23 3 3 3 2
22 2 2
0 →1 2 ⋅2 ⋅ 2 − 4 −8 + 4 +
8 − 8 − 8 −8 + 4 +
8 + 4 −8 ( ) ( )
( )
( )
† † † †
, , ,
† † † † † † † † †
, , , , , , , , ,
† † †
, , ,
i i
t w t v t w t
i i i i
s t u t s t w t u t v t v t w t s t
s t v t v t
a i e a i e a
e a a i e a a i e a a e a a i a
a a i a
δ δ
δ δ δ δ
1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0
2 22 2
2
2
− 4 − 4 −
8 − 8 − 8 +8 − 4 +
8 + 4 0
               (S42) 
From Table 1, we can obtain that there are 6, 6, 4, 4, 6 and 6 detection modes for states 
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
† † † † † † † † † †
, , , , , , , , , ,, , , ,s t u t s t v t s t w t u t v t u t w ta a a a a a a a a a and 0 1
† †
, ,v t w ta a , respectively, corresponding to the states  4,0W  and 
4,1W . Based on equation (S42) the output probability is  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
2 122
0 0
122
0 0
1 32 1 1 64 6 6 4 4 6 6 1
2 1 1 1
a b c d
a b c d
Y Y
Y Y
η η η η
η η η η
− − × + + + + + −
= − − −
                           (S43) 
Similarly, we can obtain the output probability of other participants’ photons counts under different 
inputs state. So, the gain in this case is 
( )( ){ ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )} ( )1220 0
1 16 16 1 1 10 1 1 1 1
9 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1
a b c d a c b d b d a c
a d b c b c a d c d a b Y Y
η η η η η η η η η η η η
η η η η η η η η η η η η
− − + − − + − − +  
− − + − − + − − −  
           (S44) 
In this case the error will occur with probability 
( )( ){ ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )} ( )1220 0
1 32 16 1 1 10 1 1 1 1
9 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1
a b c d a c b d b d a c
a d b c b c a d c d a b Y Y
η η η η η η η η η η η η
η η η η η η η η η η η η
− − + − − + − − +  
− − + − − + − − −  
           (S45) 
(4) Case 4: outputs deriving from three photon counts and one background count 
In this case, three counts derive from successful photon transmission and one count derives from 
background. Any state of three input photons can evolve into a state superposed by different spatial and time 
modes, e.g. the state 
0 0 0
† † †
, , , 0a t b t c ta a a  of Alice’s, Bob’s and Charlie’s photons evolves into the state (partial 
terms are omitted for simplification) 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
† † † † † † † †
, , , , , , , ,
† † † † † † † †
, , , , , , , ,
† † †
, , ,...
i i i
a t b t c t u t u t w t u t w t
i i i i
w t s t u t s t u t w t s t w t
i
v t w t s t s
a a a e a i e a a e a a
i e a i e a a e a a a i e a a
i e a a i a a
δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
δ
0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2
0 1 0
3 2 23 3 3 6 6 6
3 2 26 5 5 5
2 3
0 →1 2 ⋅2 ⋅ 2 8 − 8 +8 −
8 + 8 −16 + 24 +
+ 8 + 8 −8( ) ( ) ( )† † † † †, , , , ,t v t s t v t v ta i a a a0 0 0 0 0
2 2 3 + 8 −8 0
          (S46) 
In equation (S46), the states which may lead to successful outputs in Emma’s device include: 
0 1 0
† † †
, , ,s t u t v ta a a , 0 1 1
† † †
, , ,s t u t v ta a a , 0 1 1
† † †
, , ,s t u t w ta a a , 0 1 2
† † †
, , ,s t u t w ta a a , 0 2 0
† † †
, , ,s t u t v ta a a , 1 1 1
† † †
, , ,s t u t w ta a a , 1 0 1
† † †
, , ,s t v t w ta a a , 1 1 1
† † †
, , ,u t v t w ta a a , 
2 0 1
† † †
, , ,u t v t w ta a a , 0 0 1
† † †
, , ,s t v t w ta a a , 0 0 2
† † †
, , ,s t v t w ta a a , 1 0 1
† † †
, , ,u t v t w ta a a , 0 2 1
† † †
, , ,s t u t w ta a a , 0 1 1
† † †
, , ,s t v t w ta a a , 1 1 0
† † †
, , ,s t u t v ta a a  and 
1 0 2
† † †
, , ,u t v t w ta a a . Their coefficients are all ( )3 3 316 2 2 2⋅ ⋅ . In the former 12 terms, each one corresponds to 2 
detection modes. In the later 4 terms, each one corresponds to 1 detection mode according to Table 1.  When 
the input state is 
0 0 0
† † †
, , , 0a t b t c ta a a  the output probability of Emma’s device is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 123 3 3 0 016 2 2 2 12 2 4 1 1a b c d Y Yη η η η⋅ ⋅ × × + − −                                   (S47) 
Similarly, we can obtain the output probabilities of other participants’ photons counts under different 
inputs state. So, the gain in this case is 
( ) ( ){
( ) ( ) } ( )120 0
1 256 34 1 1
15 1 1 1
a b c d a b d c
a c d b b c d a Y Y
η η η η η η η η
η η η η η η η η
− + − +  
− + − −  
                                     (S48) 
In this case the error will occur with probability 
( ) ( ){
( ) ( ) } ( )120 0
1 256 17 1 1
7 1 1 1
a b c d a b d c
a c d b b c d a Y Y
η η η η η η η η
η η η η η η η η
− + − +  
− + − −  
                                      (S49) 
(5) Case 5: outputs deriving from four photon counts 
In this case, there exist successful outputs when the input state is one of  0010 0001 1101， ，  or 
1110 . State 0001  can be projected into states 4,0W  or 4,1W  with probability 1 4 . Let the 
identification probabilities of 4,0W  and 4,1W  be 0pD  and 1pD , respectively. When input state is 
0001  the output probability is  
( )( )120 1 01 4 1a b c d p pD D Yη η η η + −                                                    (S50) 
So, the output probability in the case is 
( )( )
( )( )
12
0 1 0
12
0 1 0
1 16 4 1 4 1
1 16 1
a b c d p p
a b c d p p
D D Y
D D Y
η η η η
η η η η
× × + −
= + −
                                             (S51) 
There is no error in this case.  
By adding all output probabilities in five cases together, the gain is 
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( )( )( )( ) ( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )( ){
( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) } ( )
( )( ){ ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
124
1 0 0
123
0 0
Q =8 1 1 1 1 1
1 16 52 1 1 1 1 1 1
38 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 16 16 1 1 10 1 1 1 1
9 1 1 1 1 8
a b c d
a b c d b a c d
c a b d d a b c
a b c d a c b d b d a c
a d b c b c a d c d
Y Y
Y Y
η η η η
η η η η η η η η
η η η η η η η η
η η η η η η η η η η η η
η η η η η η η η η η
− − − − − +
− − − + − − − +  
− − − + − − − − +  
− − + − − + − − +  
− − + − − +   ( )( )} ( )
( ) ( ){
( ) ( ) } ( )
( )( )
122
0 0
12
0 0
12
0 1 0
1 1 1
1 256 34 1 1
15 1 1 1
1 16 1
a b
a b c d a b d c
a c d b b c d a
a b c d p p
Y Y
Y Y
D D Y
η η
η η η η η η η η
η η η η η η η η
η η η η
− − − +
− + − +  
− + − − +  
+ −
         (S52) 
, and the QBER is 
( )( )( )( ) ( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )( ){
( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) } ( )
( )( ){ ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
124
1 0 0
123
0 0
4 1 1 1 1 1
1 16 26 1 1 1 1 1 1
19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 32 16 1 1 10 1 1 1 1
9 1 1 1 1 8
a b c d
a b c d b a c d
c a b d d a b c
a b c d a c b d b d a c
a d b c b c a d c d
e Y Y
Y Y
η η η η
η η η η η η η η
η η η η η η η η
η η η η η η η η η η η η
η η η η η η η η η η
= − − − − − +
− − − + − − − +  
− − − + − − − − +  
− − + − − + − − +  
− − + − − +   ( )( )} ( )
( ) ( ){
( ) ( ) } ( )
122
0 0
12
0 0
1 1 1
1 256 17 1 1
7 1 1 1
a b
a b c d a b d c
a c d b b c d a
Y Y
Y Y
η η
η η η η η η η η
η η η η η η η η
− − − +
− + − +  
− + − −  
.          (S53) 
We assume that four optical fiber links and four detectors are identical, i.e. a c d bη η η η η= = = = . So, 
equations (S52) and (S53) can be simplified as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
12 4 3 24 3 2 2
1 0 0 0 0
3 4
0 0 1
1 1024 1 1440 1 496 1
49 1 8 128p p
Q Y Y Y Y
Y D D
η η η η η
η η η
= − − + − + − +
− + + 
                         (S54) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
12 4 3 24 3 2 2
1 0 0 0 0
1
3
0
1 1 64 1 90 1 31 1
16
3 1
e Y Y Y Y
Q
Y
η η η η η
η η
= − − + − + − +
− 
                          (S55) 
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